Barbara Herman, Morality as Rationality: A Study of Kant’s Ethics, Routledge, Abingdon and New York, 2016. by Roljic, Milica Smajevic
BARBARA HERMAN, MORALITY AS RATIONALITY: A STUDY OF KANT’S 
ETHICS, ROUTLEDGE, ABINGDON AND NEW YORK, 2016.
Milica Smajević
In her book Morality as Rationality: 
A Study of Kant’s Ethics, Barbara Her-
man set a clear goal: to show that the 
central claims of Kant’s ethics can be 
properly understood only if we accept 
the thesis that morality is a form of ra-
tionality. In other words, Herman ar-
gues that within Kant’s practical phi-
losophy all moral principles are rational 
and when we act in accordance with 
them we act rationally. In order to jus-
tify her main thesis, she focused primar-
ily on two aspects of Kant’s ethics (vo-
lition and imperatives) and divided her 
book into six chapters: the first offers 
introductory remarks, the second pro-
vides an explanation of Kant’s under-
standing of maxims, the third is devot-
ed to hypothetical imperatives, and the 
last three chapters deal with different 
formulations of the categorical imper-
ative. This book offers a very detailed 
and systematic account of Kant’s theo-
ry of moral motivation and represents 
the result of a careful and lengthy anal-
ysis of Kant’s ethical theory. Offering at 
the same time an innovative and faithful 
interpretation of Kant’s Groundwork of 
the Metaphysics of Morals, Herman in-
troduces us to new possible ways of un-
derstanding Kant’s argument.
In the introductory chapter, the 
main focus is on the analysis of the re-
lationship between volition and imper-
atives in Kant’s ethics. Herman shows 
that the notion of volition that Kant uses 
leads us to the notion of imperatives as 
objective principles of rational willing. 
To have a will is to have the ability to 
be moved by the laws and principles of 
the reason. Imperatives express the re-
lationship between will and objective 
principles of reason; they command the 
will to follow the laws of the reason. The 
author emphasizes that will is the core 
of practical rationality, and that our ac-
tions can be characterized as rational or 
irrational only because of the fact that 
we, as human beings, possess the will. 
When assessing the rationality of an act, 
we must interpret that act as it stems 
from the will.
Given that the volition is one of the 
main subjects of inquiry in Herman’s 
book, it is understandable why she de-
voted the entire second chapter to the 
analysis of maxims – subjective princi-
ples of action. She believes that the ex-
isting accounts of maxims are incom-
plete and that even Kant himself does 
not offer a clear and precise definition 
of this term. For this reason, the author 
tries to provide an adequate account of 
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maxims. In her opinion, each maxim 
must contain a description of the act, 
the relevant circumstances, the agent’s 
motives and the expected outcome. If it 
is too general, the maxim cannot per-
form its function – it cannot be used to 
assess the rationality of an action. Her-
man emphasizes that determining the 
agent’s motives are very important for 
specifying the maxim of an action. 
The hypothetical imperatives, which 
are the main topic of the third chapter, 
offer the answer to the question whether 
the subjective maxim is at the same time 
objective. In order to determine whether 
an agent’s action is rational, it is neces-
sary to assess her maxim via the hypo-
thetical imperative. The author critically 
examines the nature and correct method 
of application of hypothetical impera-
tives and seeks to show how these im-
peratives govern our actions. Herman 
thinks that Kant places the source of the 
authority of hypothetical imperatives in 
the nature of human rational will. She 
analyzes the relationship between max-
ims and hypothetical imperatives and 
tries to determine how that relationship 
fits into the account of human volition 
that she attributes to Kant. 
Although interpreters most often 
emphasize the differences between hy-
pothetical and categorical imperatives, 
Herman believes that pointing out simi-
larities between the two types of imper-
atives is of great importance. It is usu-
ally said that hypothetical imperatives 
prescribe what we need to do if we want 
to achieve a specific goal, while a cate-
gorical imperative prescribes what we 
should do regardless of the goals we set. 
While this is true, the author thinks that 
such an explanation of imperatives does 
not show what their similarities are and 
does not point out that both types of im-
peratives are the principles of rational 
volition. To give us an insight into the 
relationship between the two types of 
imperatives, after analyzing the hypo-
thetical imperatives in the third chapter, 
Herman devotes the second part of her 
book to the examination of the categor-
ical imperative. In this way, the author 
follows the order of argument present-
ed in the Groundwork of the Metaphys-
ics of Morals.  
The goal of the fourth chapter (the 
first of the three devoted to the cate-
gorical imperative) is to introduce and 
explain the concept of the categorical 
imperative, as well as its first formula-
tion – the Formula of Universal Law. 
Herman shows how Kant comes to the 
first and most popular formulation of 
the categorical imperative, and how he 
defines it in the light of previously in-
troduced concepts, such as maxims, vo-
lition and hypothetical imperatives. She 
tries to explain why Kant claims that 
there is only one categorical imperative, 
and at the same time offers us different 
formulations of this imperative. Her-
man does not address the question of 
whether Kant succeeded in proving that 
a categorical imperative is possible, but 
rather tries to show that Kant’s notion 
of a categorical imperative is coherent. 
In her opinion, the two basic features of 
the categorical imperative are indepen-
dence from the agent’s ends and identi-
fication with practical law.
After analyzing the basic features 
and the first formulation of the categor-
ical imperative, the author pays atten-
tion, in the next chapter, to the second 
formulation of the categorical impera-
tive – the Formula of the Law of Nature. 
Herman argues that the introduction 
of the Formula of the Law of Nature 
is plausible and is a necessary supple-
ment to the first formula – the Formu-
la of Universal Law. Another important 
topic of this chapter is the derivation of 
duties from the categorical imperative 
as a source of moral principles. If this 
derivation can be performed, then the 
notion of a categorical imperative can 
help us to explain the notion of duty. 
The last chapter is devoted to the 
concluding remarks and the examination 
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of the main objections addressed to the 
notion of the categorical imperative. 
Herman argues that the primary func-
tion of this imperative is to assess pro-
posed actions rather than to prescribe 
one particular action. This imperative 
has clearly moral content that is closely 
related to the agent’s moral motives. In 
addition to analyzing the proper condi-
tions of employment of the categorical 
imperative, the author tries to show that 
the objections raised to this principle 
regarding the consequences of actions 
are not adequate. The general conclu-
sion that Herman draws is that if there 
is to be a connection between rational-
ity and morality, it must be evident in 
the various formulations of imperatives. 
If there are imperatives, then there are 
rational principles which provide norms 
of action that are independent of the 
goals that the agent has set.
It is noticeable that the author re-
ferred to surprisingly few relevant books 
and texts from the secondary literature 
devoted to this topic. The reason for 
this is twofold: first, at the time the au-
thor was writing her book, there was 
incomparably less literature devoted to 
Kant’s moral theory than today, and sec-
ond, Herman emphasized that in order 
to provide a faithful interpretation of 
Kant’s ethical doctrine, she wanted to 
devote most attention to Kant’s Ground-
work of the Metaphysics of Morals. Her 
methodology relies on interpreting 
Kant’s original text, not on analyzing 
and comparing existing interpretations 
of Kant’s ethics. It is significant and in-
teresting to note that the author’s view is 
that the arguments made in the Ground-
work are more convincing and stronger 
than the arguments Kant offered in his 
other ethical works. Therefore, we can-
not say that this book is a work that pro-
vides a complete historical account of 
Kant’s ethical theory, nor a comprehen-
sive review of previous interpretations, 
but we can say that the author tries to 
resolve one of the major concerns of 
Kant’s ethics: the relationship between 
morality and rationality. For a correct 
and complete account of Kant’s concep-
tion of morality, it is necessary to un-
derstand what were Kant’s assumptions 
about rationality. If we try to interpret 
Kant’s account of morality by using, for 
example, Hume’s understanding of ra-
tionality, we will be on the wrong track 
and this is something we must always be 
aware of. Barbara Herman’s book pro-
vides us with a comprehensive insight 
into all the factors that, according to 
Kant, influence human actions such as 
the circumstances of the agent and the 
motives that move her to act. This book 
undoubtedly represents a valuable con-
tribution to the understanding and in-
terpretation of Kant’s theory of moral 
motivation offered in the Groundwork. 
This study is most useful for students 
of philosophy, but also for anyone who 
wants to deepen their understanding of 
Kant’s ethics.
